Tuesday, 16 August 2016

This Blog Could be used as Evidence of Entryism in the Labour Party


James Patterson, a Labour Councillor in Haringey was a Green Party candidate in the same ward

Along with anti-Semitism, sexism, losing the EU referendum, being incapable of compromise and being unelectable as Prime Minister, Jeremy Corbyn is now accused of encouraging ‘entryism’ to the Labour Party.

Tom Watson, Labour’s deputy leader, has said that although not all new members come into this category, ‘old hands are twisting young arms,’ and these Machiavellian types don’t have the best interests of the Labour Party at heart.

I dare say a few ex Labour members who left in despair at what Tony Blair had turned the Labour Party into, have returned to the fold under Corbyn’s leadership. But to claim that they are taking advantage of young, idealistic new members to push their revolutionary agenda is patronising to the newer members, and lacks anything in the way of evidence.

Watson quotes some statements from the Alliance for Workers Liberty (AWL) blogsite, Shiraz Socialist, as evidence of this entryism, but it is pretty flimsy stuff. The AWL has disbanded and urged its members to join the Labour Party, so what? They don’t have many more than a hundred members anyway, and incidentally they argued for Remaining in the European Union at the recent referendum. 

Not a standard ‘Trot’ line to take, judging by other far left groupings stance on the issue. I’m assuming all these people will be denied membership of Labour, under the entryism argument, even if they haven’t stood against Labour at an election in the last five years, which is apparently the rule.

Contrast this with the case of ex Tory MP, Shaun Woodward, who was elected as a Tory MP in 1997, but was allowed to defect to new Labour in 1999, and was given a safe seat in St Helen’s South in 2001. It was said that he employed a butler. Wikipedia says this about him:

‘’He added a seventh property to his property portfolio in January 2010 and now has a £1M apartment in an alpine resort, along with a £1.35M London flat, a £7M property in the Hamptons, a £5M villa in Mustique, a house in the south of France, a £2M townhouse and a modest £85,000 home in his former St. Helens constituency.”

I take it the five year rule did not apply in 1999, or is entryism just allowable for Tories?

Closer to home, in Haringey where I live, James Patterson, who had been a Labour member in Brighton, moved to Haringey and joined the Green Party in 2008. He stood at a council by-election in the same year, for the Green Party, and again at the full council elections in 2010. He was also the campaign manager for our council target ward.

After the 2010 general election, he resigned from the Green Party and re-joined the Labour Party, ‘to vote for Ed Miliband for leader,’ as he told me at the time. In 2014 he was elected as a Labour councillor (in the same ward he had stood as a Green), so no five year rule in 2014 either? Or is this somehow different from the entryism that is apparently plaguing the Labour Party in 2016?

The constituency Labour Party where James Patterson is a member, Hornsey and Wood Green, is one of the few constituency parties who are backing Owen Smith for Labour leader. Patterson was also one of the local Labour councillors who signed an open petition supporting the recent Labour MPs vote of no confidence in Corbyn as Labour leader.

Some Corbyn supporting Labour members have asked me to join Labour, but I last stood against Labour, as a Green, in the 2014 council elections, so I expect they would reject me, and I’ve written dozens of blog posts here which are critical of the Labour Party, especially before Corbyn became leader.

Either way, I’m not minded to try and join Labour anyway, to test my theory. It does seem as though there is good entryism and bad entryism according to the Labour Party. Or maybe if they just suspect people might support Corbyn for leader, they are barred? Answers on a postcard, please.

Monday, 15 August 2016

Green Party at 7% in Opinion Poll – Highest since the Green Surge as Labour Fall




A national opinion poll by TNS shows the Green Party at 7%, which is the highest poll rating since the Green surge, just prior to the general election in 2015. We are all somewhat sceptical of opinion polls after the recent failures to predict the general election and EU referendum accurately, and this poll has a margin of error of + or – 4%, but bear with me.

If we assume that there is some truth in this poll, then what might the reasons be for this doubling of support for the Greens, from around 3% or 4%? There could be a number of factors at play here.

The Green Party has a leadership and deputy leadership election on at the moment, but this hasn’t received much attention in the mainstream media, save a little in The Guardian and Independent, which is par for the course. I shouldn’t have thought the internal election has had much impact on Green voters, although the possible return of Caroline Lucas to the leadership (joint), may have had a little.

Most Greens voted to remain in the European Union at the recent referendum, and as we seen with the Lib Dems, the Brexit result has increased membership, so there be a small bounce from this.

The US Green Party has received some media attention on this side of the Atlantic, mainly in Bernie Sanders’ slipstream, but again only in the usual media suspects (as mentioned above). I don’t think it is having much effect on voting intentions in the UK.

This year has been the hottest on record (globally), and weather patterns often give a boost to Green Parties, but this is normally of the obviously adverse type. In the UK that means flooding, which we haven’t had much of recently, so this can probably be discounted too.

I think by far the likeliest explanation for this rise in this poll (which isn’t reflected in other polling), is the ongoing shambles in the Labour Party. Look at Labour’s polling figure of 26% in this poll (which is reflected in other polls). It looks as though Labour has lost support to Greens (and maybe Lib Dems), at least to some extent.

Unquestionably, the coup launched by Labour MPs and the Labour Right in general, against Corbyn’s leadership, which has received much media attention, has had a detrimental effect on Labour’s standing. Even if you don’t believe all of the ridiculous claims being made by the plotters, and risible they mainly are, but who would want to vote for a party in the midst of a civil war?

I always knew that the Labour Party establishment wasn’t going to accept the shift to the left that Corbyn’s election as leader represents, and sure enough they are tearing the party in two, but whoever triumphs in this year’s re-run of the leadership election, the split will not be healed anytime soon.  

The voters can get similar policies to what Corbyn is advocating, from the Green Party, and without all the unpleasantness that we see from the Labour Party, and from a united party too. Labour is now the 'nasty' party.

I wish Corbyn well in what he trying to do with the Labour Party, but I’ve always thought the odds were stacked against him reforming Labour into a genuine party of the left. Only time will tell if he can be successful, but it is clear that his opponents would rather see the Labour Party destroyed, than let it become a proper party of the left.

What we have seen in Greece and Spain, (although Portugal bucks this tend to some extent), is social movements forming new parties of the left, not taking over the main social democrat parties in their countries, and in time people may conclude that here in the UK that should happen too. The Greens, although not new are certainly untainted, and maybe could become this new left party?

What is going on in the Labour Party presents a massive opportunity for the Greens, and I hope that whoever is elected as leader of the Greens, will fully exploit this opening on the left of UK politics.


Sunday, 14 August 2016

Book Review - Capitalism is the culprit



Written by Bill Crane and first published at International Socialist Review

Fossil Capital, which is the Swedish Marxist Andreas Malm’s first book in English, is a wide-ranging explanation of the manner in which capitalism tends toward climate crisis in the present era. Through his examination of the rise of English industry in the early decades of the nineteenth century, he provides a convincing rebuttal to antihumanist theories of the Anthropocene era and offers some key clues about how we can transcend the “fossil economy” as a species.

Malm situates the origins of climate change in the transition to the coal-powered steam engine from waterpower in Britain’s textile industry. Coal had been used for centuries in Britain, but only to heat and cook in the domestic sphere. (It was widely used in China under the Northern Song dynasty as well.) Even after James Watt invented the self-acting steam engine in the 1770s, it was not adopted on a mass scale until decades later.

Watt’s invention at first seemed exorbitantly expensive for a developing industry. Water wheels, which Karl Marx noted had been bequeathed to Europe by the

Roman Empire as “the elementary form of all machinery,” continued to operate most of Britain’s industry into the 1820s. Even long after the transition to coal, there were strong advocates among British industry arguing that waterpower was cheaper, cleaner, and more effective.

The coal-powered steam engine, however, offered several advantages that water could not. First, rivers are not located everywhere. Enterprises based on waterpower had to summon their workers from elsewhere. Secondly, the currents of rivers do not always flow the same. Water mills hence could not run on the regular hours of capitalist enterprises elsewhere.

In chapter 6, Malm shows how inventors and visionaries like the Scottish engineer Robert Thom argued against the mass employment of steam engines. Thom developed plans for large-scale industrial colonies along rivers in southern England, where textile mills could share the abundance of the nearby water as well as housing and facilities for workers recruited from the cities. Thomas Ashworth, a fellow engineer, pioneered similar plans for his home county of Lancashire. In presenting a plan for three large reservoirs on the River Tame to a select committee of Parliament in 1837, he stated, “I believe the plan proposed is the cheapest mode of . . . giving mechanical power . . . I have no doubt that they will give up steam engines.”

Reservoir schemes by Thom, Ashworth, and others kept running into the same problem: Capitalists would have to collaborate in order to make a return to water effective. For capitalists invested in the booming textile industry, banding together to figure out how to evenly distribute the power from water required intelligence, skill, and management that many were not inclined to learn. “Steam,” Malm writes, “was the ruder option, more easily understood and manipulated, [and] less of an art.”

Transitioning to steam allowed capital to set to work when and where it wanted to, and to recruit workers how it liked. In the 1820s, the steam-powered self-acting mule allowed textile manufacturers in Lancashire to throw a whole generation of striking skilled workers out of employment and bring them back as unskilled machine-minders, begging for a pittance. Malm notes that water, a common resource unlike coal, hardly lent itself to a similar capitalist division of labor.  

In the central chapter of his study, which bears the same title as the book, Malm argues for an alteration of Marx’s equation for the circulation of capital proposed in volume one of Capital. Supplies of fossil fuel are a presupposition for modern capitalist production. Fossil fuels, whether in the form of coal, oil, or natural gas, are also, of course, produced and sold as commodities under capitalism. This explains the great power of the fossil fuel lobby and hints at why conquering our dependence on this fuel seems such an enormous task.

Malm devotes a chapter in the middle of the book to the relationship between fuel and workers’ resistance. Radical workers understood the role of fuel in the industry that oppressed them to the point that they deliberately “went to stop the steam,” pulling out the plugs of steam engines and thus debilitating them during the Chartist general strike of 1842. He notes that capitalism’s reliance on coal gave a potentially huge amount of power to coal miners, while the transition to oil power a century later led to dependence on workers in the oil fields of the Middle East.

By situating the beginnings of climate change specifically in British industry during the nineteenth century, Malm is able to overcome to a significant extent the moralism that has plagued various formulations regarding the Anthropocene era—the most recent period of geological time in which human activity has profoundly affected the planet.

Some of the most extreme argue that by containing easily combustible resources, the planet Earth itself is responsible for global warming. More moderate proponents will argue instead that human activity, beginning with the discovery of fire, leads directly to climate change. Reading Malm makes clear that the discovery of flame cannot account for global warming. Humans used fire, and indeed coal, for millennia without affecting the climate. It is only under a specific kind of social relation—fossil fuels linked to perpetual industrial growth unique to capitalism—that global warming occurs.

Even such a pioneering and innovative study as Fossil Capital has its weak points. It is based on Malm’s doctoral dissertation, and its erudition in one specific area of social science can be difficult for readers (like myself) who do not share his background. Similarly, Malm draws deeply on several different schools of Marxist thought, including Robert Brenner and Ellen Wood’s historical interpretation of the rise of capitalism in England, the structuralist Marxism of Louis Althusser, and Henri Lefebvre’s work on capitalism’s production of space. Readers not familiar with these various schools of Marxism may find it difficult to follow some of Malm’s arguments, though time spent reading his book carefully will be well compensated.

More concerning is Malm’s near-exclusive focus on the development of the fossil economy in England alone from the years 1770–1840. One advantage of this approach, as with Brenner and Wood’s “political Marxism,” is that it allows him to account for the rise of the fossil fuel economy in the dynamic of a very specific period in capitalism’s history, but there emerges the problem of applying tendencies specific to one country to the rest of world capitalist history. This is evident at the end of Fossil Capital, where Malm abruptly shifts from nineteenth-century England to “China as the chimney of the world” without much attempt to bridge the historical gap. The transition from coal to petroleum is left unaccounted for.

Possibly Malm will begin to cover this in the sequel, Fossil Empire. Anyone with an interest in ecology, and anyone opposed to capitalism, must read Malm’s crucial contribution to understand how and why capitalism makes war on planet Earth. But it should be read alongside general works of left-wing ecology, like John Bellamy Foster’s Marx’s Ecology and Chris Williams’ Ecology and Socialism, and specific historical work, like Robert Vitalis’ America’s Kingdom, on the rise of the oil economy.

Friday, 12 August 2016

The Myth of New Labour’s Electoral appeal to Labour Voters



After eighteen miserable years of Tory rule, Tony Blair’s New Labour was swept into office in 1997, with a landslide victory. I was as pleased as anyone to see the back of the Tories, and watching the results come in the early hours of Friday morning, it did just keep getting better. One after another, top Tories were felled, culminating in the defeat of arch Thatcherite, Michael Portillo.

I knew Labour had tacked considerably to right under Blair, and so was not expecting much from the incoming Labour government, but it was good to see the Tories, long our arrogant rulers, completely thrashed. As it turned out, even my low expectations of Labour were confounded. New Labour was actually even worse than I had expected.

The turn out for the 1997 general election was 71.3%, which by today’s standards is good, indeed it has not been bettered since. But by historical standards it is on the low side. The previous general election in 1992 had a turn out of 77.7% and every general election since the second World War had a higher turn out than in 1997 up until that point.

Turn out at the next general election in 2001, was a dismal 59.4% which recovered a little in 2005 to 61.4% and again in 2010 to 65.1% (under Gordon Brown’s premiership). Hardly popular endorsements, even though Labour won easily until 2010.

What happened is that voters in 1992 gave John Major’s Tories the benefit of the doubt, after Margaret Thatcher was ousted eighteen months previously. That benefit of the doubt evaporated after only four months, when Black Monday sent sterling hurtling out of the Exchange Rate Mechanism with the subsequent loss of billions of pounds to currency speculators, George Soros chief amongst them. 

It was a national humiliation, and the voters never forgave the Tories for it.

On top of this, Major’s government was wracked with division, over Europe, and mired in sleaze, of the sexual and financial kind, and the voters just bided their time until kicking them out in 1997, in spectacular fashion.   

So the myth of New Labour’s electoral prowess was born, but in reality it was the Tories profound unpopularity with British voters that led to Blair’s victories. The Tories also lost seats to the Lib Dems and the idea of ‘tactical voting’ took hold like never before. Basically, whoever was best placed to keep the Tories out in any particular constituency, usually Labour or the Lib Dems, got the votes.

The low voting turn outs over the Blair years were most pronounced in Labour’s traditional heartlands, Manchester, Liverpool, South Wales, Leeds etc. New Labour stalwart, Hilary Benn was elected to Parliament for the first time at a by-election in 1999, on a turn out of just 19.6%. A record for low turn out at the time, but since beaten by Lucy Powell, another anti-Corbyn rebel MP in 2012, in Manchester Central with a paltry 18.2% turn out.

This trend continued under Ed Miliband’s leadership with the 20 lowest turn out seats in the 2015 general election, all safe Labour ones. These seats are under threat from UKIP now, and the idea that a return to Blairism by Labour would halt this trend is for the birds.

Incidentally, one of the strains of the ‘Corbyn is unelectable’ mantra put about by the New Labour tendency MPs at the moment, is that Corbyn lacks leadership qualities, but the same could have been said about Ed Miliband, but wasn’t. No rebellions from MPs when Miliband was leader, although there was some muttering, no tantrums, no leadership challenge.

This is because what the New Labour faction don’t like about Corbyn is his policies, it has nothing to do with his ‘leadership qualities,’ it is purely ideological.

New Labour Tory-light policies have been rejected by the electorate twice now, so how this can be held up as a winning formula is beyond rationality, but that is because it is all bollocks. 
     

Wednesday, 10 August 2016

Green Governance: Ecological Survival, Human Rights and the Commons



Written by David Bollier & Burns H. Weston and first published at The Wealth of the Commons

At least since Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, we have known about humankind’s squandering of nonrenewable resources, its careless disregard of precious life species and its overall contamination and degradation of delicate ecosystems. In recent decades, these defilements have assumed a systemic dimension. Lately we have come to realize the shocking extent to which our atmospheric emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases threatens Planet Earth.

If the human species is going to overcome the many interconnected ecological catastrophes now confronting us, this moment in history requires that we entertain some bold modifications of our legal structures and political culture. We must find the means to introduce new ideas for effective and just environmental protection – locally, nationally, regionally, globally, and points in between.

We believe that effective and just environmental protection is best secured via commons- and rights-based ecological governance, operational from local to global and administered according to principles rooted in respect for nature and fellow human beings. We call it “green governance.” We also believe that the rigorous application of a reconceptualized human right to a clean and healthy environment (or “right to environment”) is the best way actually to promote environmental well-being while meeting everyone’s basic needs.


Making the transition to a new paradigm


It is our premise that human societies will not succeed in overcoming our myriad eco-crises through better “green technology” or economic reforms alone; we must pioneer new types of governance that allow and encourage people to move from anthropocentrism to biocentrism, and to develop qualitatively different types of relationships with nature itself and, indeed, with each other. An economics and supporting civic polity that valorizes growth and material development as the precondition for virtually everything else are ultimately a dead end – literally.

Achieving a clean, healthy and ecologically balanced environment requires that we cultivate a practical governance paradigm based on, first, a logic of respect for nature, sufficiency, interdependence, shared responsibility and fairness among all human beings; and, second, an ethic of integrated global and local citizenship that insists upon transparency and accountability in all activities affecting the integrity of the environment.

We believe that commons- and rights-based ecological governance – green governance – can fulfill this logic and ethic. Properly done, it can move us beyond the neoliberal State and Market alliance – what we call the “State/Market” – which is chiefly responsible for the current, failed paradigm of ecological governance. (We capitalize “State,” “Market” and Commons here when referrring to them as systems of governance and power.)

The basic problem is that the price system, seen as the ultimate governance mechanism of our polity, falls short in its ability to represent notions of value that are subtle, qualitative, long-term and complicated. These are, however, precisely the attributes of natural systems. The price system has trouble taking account of qualitatively different types of value on their own terms, most notably the “carrying capacity” of natural systems and their inherent usage limits. Exchange value is the primary if not the exclusive concern. This, in fact, is the grand narrative of conventional economics. Gross Domestic Product represents the sum total of all market activity, whether that activity is truly beneficial to society or not. Conversely, anything that does not have a price and exists “outside” the market is regarded (for the purposes of policymaking) as having subordinate or no value.

What is more, it is an open secret that various industry lobbies have captured if not corrupted the legislative process in countries around the world; and that the regulatory apparatus, for all its necessary functions, is essentially incapable of fulfilling its statutory mandates, let alone pioneering new standards of environmental stewardship. Further, regulation has become ever more insulated from citizen influence and accountability as scientific expertise and technical proceduralism have come to be more and more the exclusive determinants of who may credibly participate in the process.Given the parameters of the administrative State and the neoliberal policy consensus, truly we have reached the limits of leadership and innovation within existing institutions and policy structures.

Still, it will not be an easy task to make the transition from State/Market ecological governance to commons- and rights-based ecological governance. Green governance is, indeed, a daunting proposition. It entails serious reconsideration of some of the most basic premises of our economic, political and legal orders, and of our cultural orders as well. It requires that we enlarge our understanding of “value” in economic thought to account for nature and social well-being; that we expand our sense of human rights and how they can serve strategic as well as moral purposes; that we liberate ourselves from the limitations of State-centric models of legal process; and that we honor the power of non-market participation, local context, and social diversity in structuring economic activity and addressing environmental problems.

Of course, there is also the deeper issue of whether contemporary civilization can be persuaded to disrupt the status quo to save our “lonely planet.” Much will depend on our ability to articulate and foster a coherent new paradigm of ecological stewardship. Fortunately, there are some very robust, encouraging developments now beginning to flourish on the periphery of the mainstream political economy. These include insurgent schools of thought in economics, ecological management, and human rights aided by fledgling grassroots movements, e.g., the Occupy movement and Internet communities. Although disparate and irregularly connected, each seeks in its own way to address the many serious deficiencies of centralized governments (corruption, lack of transparency, rigidity, a marginalized citizenry) and concentrated markets (externalized costs, fraud, the bigger-better-faster ethos of material progress). Taken together, these trends suggest the emergent contours of a new paradigm of ecological governance.

For all their power and potential, however, none of these movements or their visions can prevail without some serious grounding in law. And in this regard we believe the legal and moral claims of human rights can be the kind of powerful, mobilizing discourse that is needed for real change. Human rights can provide a broad, flexible platform and a respected legal framework for asserting the right of everyone to a clean and healthy environment.


The human right to a clean and healthy environment


Human rights signal a public order of human dignity, for which environmental well-being is essential. They consequently challenge and make demands upon State sovereignty, and upon the parochial agendas of private elites as well. They trump most other legal obligations, being juridically more elevated than commonplace “standards,” “laws,” or mere policy choices. And they carry with them a sense of entitlement on the part of the rights-holder, and thus facilitate legal and political empowerment.

For these and other reasons, we believe that the human right to a clean and healthy environment can be a powerful tool for imagining and securing a system of ecological, governance in the common interest. But there are skeptics who say that the right does not exist except in moral terms – that it lacks the elements of authority and/or control requisite to making it count as law. Are they right? The answer is both “yes” and “no.”

According to the law of the State system, there are at least three ways in which the human right to environment is today officially recognized juridically:
  • As an entitlement derived from other recognized rights, centering primarily on the substantive rights to life, to health and to respect for private and family life, but embracing occasionally other perceived surrogate rights as well – e.g., habitat, property, livelihood, culture, dignity, equality or nondiscrimination, and sleep;
  • As an entitlement autonomous unto itself, dependent on no more than its own recognition and increasingly favored over the derivative approach insofar as national constitutional and regional treaty prescriptions proclaiming such a right are evidence; and
  • As a cluster of procedural entitlements generated from a “reformulation and expansion of existing human rights and duties” (akin to the derivative substantive rights noted first above) and commonly referred to as “procedural environmental rights,” i.e., the right to environmental information, to participation in decisionmaking, and to administrative and judicial recourse.
A careful review of each of these official manifestations of the right to environment around the world reveals that, however robust in their particularized applications, they are essentially limited in their legal recognition and jurisdictional reach. It also shows that, as part of our legal as well as moral inheritance, the right to environment needs to be taken extra seriously. For this to happen – indeed, for Earth itself to survive and be hospitable to life upon it– the right must be reimagined and reinvigorated, and as soon as possible.

Juridically, this right is most strongly recognized in its derivative form, i.e., derived from other recognized legal rights, rather than in its autonomous form, i.e., legally recognized in its own right. When framed autonomously, interestingly, the right is found to exist principally – indeed, almost exclusively – in the developing worlds of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. There is also a growing sentiment (primarily at the regional level so far) to recognize procedural environmental rights.

But at bottom, it seems that as long as ecological governance remains in the grip of essentially unregulated (liberal or neoliberal) capitalism, there never will be a human right to environment – certainly not an autonomous one, widely recognized and honored across the globe in any formal or official sense.

In recent years, however, two attractive alternative approaches have emerged. The first approach – intergenerational environmental rights – though firm in legal theory, relies heavily on its ability to appeal to the moral conscience. The second – nature’s environmental rights – pioneered by the governments of Ecuador and Bolivia, chooses to alter the procedural playing field altogether. These nations assert that nature has legal rights of its own that must be defended by human surrogates.

Both these approaches go beyond the narrow anthropocentrism of existing law. In their legal character they are autonomous rights rather than derivative rights. They look to claimant surrogates to enforce the rights. And they are asserted primarily at the official national and subnational levels.

Politically, both approaches reflect a deep frustration with the environmental community’s conventional terms of advocacy and with the formal legal order’s deep commitments to neoliberalism.

However, barring some game-changing ecological disaster, huge economic and political forces will continue to resist these innovative legal gambits for reasons that are both historical and philosophical. Green governance that looks to the Commons points toward a different approach for securing a right to a clean and healthy environment. It calls for the establishment of a new procedural environmental right, the human right to commons- and rights-based ecological governance.


The commons as a model for ecological governance


A commons is a regime for managing common-pool resources that eschews individual property rights and State control. It relies instead on common property arrangements that tend to be self-organized and enforced in complex, idiosyncratic social ways. A commons is generally governed by what we call Vernacular Law – the “unofficial” norms, institutions, and procedures that a peer community devises to manage community resources on its own, and typically democratically. State Law and action may set the parameters within which Vernacular Law operates, but it does not directly control how a given commons is organized and managed.

In this way, the Commons operates in a quasi-sovereign manner, similar to the Market but largely escaping the centralized mandates of the State and the logic of Market exchange while mobilizing decentralized participation “on the ground.” In its broadest sense, the Commons could become an important vehicle for assuring a right to environment at local, regional, national, and global levels. But this role will require innovative legal and policy norms, institutions and procedures to recognize and support Commons as a matter of law.

The Commons represents an advance over existing governance because it gives us practical ways of naming and protecting value that the market is incapable of doing, and, as already noted, in an essentially democratic manner. For example, the Commons gives us a vocabulary for talking about the proper limits of Market activity—and for enforcing those limits. Commons discourse helps force a conversation about the “market externalities” that often are shunted to the periphery of economic theory, politics and policymaking. It asks questions such as: How can appropriate limits be set on the market exploitation of nature? What legal principles, institutions, and procedures can help manage a shared resource fairly and sustainably over time, sensitive to the ecological rights of future as well as present generations?

The paradigm of green governance is compelling because it comprises at once a basis in rich legal tradition that extends back centuries, an attractive cultural discourse that can organize and personally energize people, and a widespread participatory social practice that, at this very moment, is producing practical results in projects big and small, local and transnational.

The history of legal recognition of the Commons, and thus the commoners’ right to the environment, goes back centuries and even millennia. There were forestry conservation laws in effect as early as 1700 B.C. Pharaoh Akhenaten established nature reserves in Egypt in 1370 B.C. Hugo Grotius, often called the father of international law, argued in his famous treatise Mare Liberum (1609) that the seas must be free for navigation and fishing because the law of nature prohibits ownership of things that appear “to have been created by nature for common things”(Baslar 1998).1 Antarctica has been managed as a stable, durable inter­governmental commons since the ratification of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959, enabling inter­national scientists to cooperate in major research projects without the threat of military conflict over territorial claims. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 declares outer space, the moon and other celestial bodies to be the “province of all mankind” and “not subject to national appropriation….”

Commons have been a durable transcultural institution for assuring that people can have direct access to, and use of, natural resources, or that government can act as a formal trustee on behalf of the public interest – what we call “State trustee commons.” Commons regimes have acted as a kind of counterpoint to the dominant systems of power because, though the structures of State power have varied over the centuries (tribes, monarchies, feudal estates, republics), managing a forest, fishery, or marshland as a commons addresses certain ontological human wants and needs that endure: the need to meet one’s subsistence needs through cooperative uses of shared resources; the expectation of basic fairness and respectful treatment; and the right to a clean, healthy environment.

In this sense, the various historical fragments of what may be called “commons law” (not to be confused with the common law) constitute a legal tradition that can advance human and environmental rights. These regimes speak to the elemental moral consensus that all the creations of nature and society that we inherit from previous generations should be protected and held in trust for future generations.

In our time, the State and Market are seen as the only credible or significant forces for governance. But in fact the Commons is an eminently practical and versatile mode of governance for ecological resources, among many other forms of shared wealth. The viability of the Commons has been overlooked not just because of the persistence of the Hardin “tragedy” parable and the overweening power of the State/Market, but because the Commons exists in so many forms and is managed by so many different types of commoners.


Imagining a new architecture of law and policy to support the ecological commons


For a shift to this paradigm to take place, State law and public policy must formally recognize and support the countless commons that now exist and the new ones that must be created. By such means, the State, working with civil society, could facilitate the rise of a Commons Sector, an eclectic array of commons-based institutions, projects, social practices, and values that advance the policy of collective action. Extending to the Commons the legal recognition and generous backing the “free state” and “free market” have enjoyed for generations would unleash tremendous energy and creativity needed to provide better institutional stewardship of our planet. Such recognition of Commons could also help transform the State and Market in many positive ways, not least by checking the cronyism, corruption and secrecy that currently mark each.

If the Commons is going to achieve its promise as a governance template, however, there must be a suitable architecture of law and public policy to support it. We believe that innovations in law and policy are needed in three distinct fields:
  1. General internal governance principles and policies that can guide the development and management of commons;
  2. Macro-principles and policies – laws, institutions and procedures – that the State/Market can embrace to develop commons and “peer governance”; and
  3. Catalytic legal strategies that commoners (civil society and distinct communities), the State, and international intergovernmental bodies can pursue to validate, protect and support ecological commons thus defined.
General internal governance principles and policies. Ostrom’s eight core design principles, first published in 1990, remain the most solid foundation for understanding the internal governance of commons as a general paradigm. In a book-length study published in 2010, Poteete, Janssen and Ostrom summarize and elaborate on the key factors enabling self-organized groups to develop collective solutions to common-pool resource problems at small to medium scales:
Among the most important are the following: 1) reliable information is available about the immediate and long-term costs and benefits of actions; 2) the individuals involved see the resources as important for their own achievements and have a long-term time horizon; 3) gaining a reputation for being a trust­worthy reciprocator is important to those involved; 4) individuals can com­municate with at least some of the others involved; 5) informal monitoring and sanctioning is feasible and considered appropriate; and 6) social capital and leadership exist, related to previous successes in solving joint problems (Poteete, Janssen and Ostrom 2010).
Ostrom notes that “extensive empirical research on collective action...has repeatedly identified a necessary central core of trust and reciprocity among those involved that is associated with successful levels of collective action.” In addition, “when participants fear they are being ‘suckers’ for taking costly actions while others enjoy a free ride,” it enhances the need for monitoring to root out deception and fraud.

If any commons is to cultivate trust and reciprocity and therefore enhance its chances of stable collective management, its operational and constitutional rules must be seen as fair and respectful. To that end, ecological commons must embody the values of human dignity as expressed in, optimally, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and nine core international human rights conventions that have evolved from it or those of them as may be applicable. As this suggests, both human rights and nature’s rights are implicit in ecological commons governance.

Macro-principles and policies. For larger-scale common-pool resources – national, regional, global – the State must play a more active role in establishing and overseeing commons. The State may have an indispensable role to play in instances where a resource cannot be easily divided into parcels (the atmosphere, oceanic fisheries) or where the resource generates large rents relative to the surrounding economy, e.g., petroleum. In such cases, it makes sense for the State to intervene and devise appropriate management systems. State trustee commons typically manage hard and soft minerals, timber, and other natural resources on public lands, national parks and wilderness areas, rivers, lakes and other bodies of water, State-sponsored research, and civil infrastructure, among other things.

In such circumstances, however, there is a structural tension between commoners and the State/Market because the State has strong economic incentives to forge deep political alliances with the Market and thus promote an agenda of privatization, commoditization and globalization despite the adverse consequences for ecosystems and commoners. Any successful regime of commons law must therefore recognize this reality and take aggressive action to ensure that the State/Market does not betray its trust obligations, particularly by colluding with market players in acts of enclosure.

The overall goal must be to reconceptualize the neoliberal State/Market as a “triarchy” with the Commons – the State/Market/Commons – to realign authority and provisioning in new, more beneficial ways.2 The State would maintain its commitments to representative governance and management of public property just as private enterprise would continue to own capital to produce saleable goods and services in the Market sector. But the State must shift its focus to become a “Partner State,” as Michel Bauwens puts it, not just of the Market Sector but also of the Commons Sector.3

Catalytic legal strategies. Perhaps the most significant challenge in advancing commons governance is the liberal polity’s indifference or hostility to most collectives (corporations excepted). Accordingly, commoners must use ingenious innovations to make their commons legally cognizable and protected. Since legal regimes vary immensely around the world, our proposals should be understood as general approaches that obviously will require modification and refinement for any given jurisdiction. Still, there are a number of legal and activist interventions that could help advance commons governance in select areas.
  • Devising ingenious adaptations of private contract and property law is a potentially fruitful way to protect commons. The basic idea is to use conventional bodies of law serving private property interests, but invert their purposes to serve collective rather than individual interests. The most famous example may be the General Public License, or GPL, which copyright owners can attach to software in order to assure that the code and any subsequent modifications of it will be forever accessible to anyone to use.4 The GPL was a seminal legal innovation in helping to establish commons for software code.
  • A number of examples of eco-minded trusts serving the interests of indigenous peoples and poorer countries could emulate private-law work-arounds to property and contract law in order to create new commons. One example is the Global Innovation Commons, a massive international database of lapsed patents that enables anyone to manufacture, modify and share ecologically significant technologies.5
  • The “stakeholder trust” could be used to manage and lease ecological resources on behalf of commoners, with revenues being distributed directly to commoners. This model is based on the Alaska Permanent Fund, which collects oil royalties from state lands on behalf of the state’s households. Some activists have proposed an Earth Atmospheric Trust to achieve similar results from the auctioning of rights to emit carbon emissions.
  • Some of the most innovative work in developing ecological commons (and knowledge commons that work in synergy with them) is emerging in local and regional circumstances. The reason is simple: the scale of such commons makes participation more feasible and the rewards more evident. Salient examples are being pioneered by the “re-localization movement” in the US and UK, and by the TransitionTown movement in more than 300 towns worldwide.6
  • Federal and provincial governments have a role to play in supporting commons formation and expansion. State and national governments usually have commerce departments that host conferences, assist small businesses, promote exports and so on. Why not analogous support for commons? Governments could also help build translocal structures that could facilitate local and subnational commons, such as Com­munity Supported Agriculture and the Slow Food movement, and thereby amplify their impact.
  • The public trust doctrine of environmental law can and should be expanded to apply to a far broader array of natural resources, including protection of the Earth’s atmosphere. This would be an important way to ensure that States act as conscientious trustees of our common ecological wealth.
  • Various digital networking technologies now make it possible to reinvent the administrative process to be more transparent, parti­cipatory and accountable – or indeed, managed as commons. For example, government wikis and “crowd-sourcing” platforms could help enlist citizen-experts to participate in policy making and enforcement. “Participatory sensing” of water quality and other environmental factors could be decentralized to citizens with a stake in those resources.

Moving forward


It might be claimed that green governance is a utopian enterprise. But the reality is that it is the neoliberal project of ever-expanding consumption on a global scale that is the utopian, totalistic dream. It manifestly cannot fulfill its mytho­logical vision of human progress through ubiquitous market activity. It simply demands more than Nature can deliver, and it inflicts too much social inequity and disruption in the process. The first step toward sanity requires that we recognize our myriad ecological crises as symptoms of an unsustainable cultural, socio­economic and political worldview.

Moving to green governance will entail many novel complexities and impon­derable challenges. Yet there is little doubt that we must re-imagine the role of the State and Market, and imagine alternative futures that fortify the Commons Sector. We must gird ourselves for the ambitious task of mobilizing new energies and commitments, deconstructing archaic institutions while building new ones, devising new public policies and legal initiatives, and cultivating new under­standings of the environment, economics, human rights, governance, and commons.


References

  • Baslar, Kemal. 1998. The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind and International Law. Boston, MA. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 1997.
  • Poteete, Amy R., Marco A. Janssen and Elinor Ostrom. 2010. Working Together: Collective Action, the Commons and Multiple Methods in Practice. Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press.
This essay is derived from a longer treatise available at The Commons Law Project, at http://www.commonslawproject.org. Bollier and Weston will publish a book on this topic, Green Governance, in early 2013 (Cambridge University Press).
  • 1. See also the essay by Prue Taylor in Part 5.
  • 2. The term “triarchy” is Michel Bauwens’, who expounds on the topic at the P2P Foundation blog, at http://blog.p2pfoundation.net/the-new-triarchy-the-commons-enterprise-the-State/2010/08/25. Peter Barnes has also been an early expositor of the Commons sector, especially in his Capitalism 3.0: A Guide to Reclaiming the Commons (2006).
  • 3. See essay by Michel Bauwens in Part 5
  • 4. See Benjamin Mako Hill’s essay on free software in Part 4.
  • 5. See David Martin’s essay on public-domain technologies in Part 4.
  • 6. See Gerd Wessling’s essay on the Transition movement in Part 3.

Monday, 8 August 2016

US Green Party Convention Adopts an Ecosocialist Position





The US Green Party is holding its convention in Houston, Texas. The city was chosen because of its association with the oil industry, which is causing so much damage to the climate. The slogan is "Houston, we have a solution."

The party voted in favour of adopting an anti-capitalist position and in favour of a decentralised vision of ecosocialism. A big moment for Green and ecosocialist politics worldwide. Take note the Green Party of England and Wales.

"This new platform plank removes the old wording entirely and addresses the economic inequalities, social inequalities, and productivism of both capitalism and state socialism and emphasizes grassroots democracyin the workplace. This workplace grassroots democracy has been largely absent from the Green platform, and many believe it is the way forward for a truly ecological economy and a new system."

The full Proposal 835 can be found here:

Andrea Mérida Cuéllar, the National Co-Chair of Green Party, said, “The themes of the left that we saw develop in the early parts of the 20th century are timely again because of the economic, social and environmental upheaval wrought by late-stage capitalism. Even though these themes have been co-opted by the political center, it's clear that the working class in this country is ready for revolution. As the true left discusses reform vs. revolution, the Green Party is now uniquely positioned to finally be the electoral tactic of grassroots movements…we are now ready to finally become the party of the 99 percent and be worthy of the attention of an anti-oppressive and leftist worker cadre.”




Jill Stein's full acceptance speech from the Convention on August 6.Stein accepted the Green Party's nomination for president, as well as addressed issues such as the prosecution of whistleblowers, campaign finance reform, student loan debt, and more.



Elijah Manley, a 17 year old who ran for president as a Green Party candidate, at the Green Party Convention in Houston, Texas on August 6, 2016. Manley discussed his transition from being a Hillary Clinton supporter to a Green Party presidential candidate. He also touched on his platform, which includes single payer health care and cutting the military budget in half.


Sunday, 7 August 2016

Sanders supporters mull ditching Hillary for Jill Stein as Green Party gathers in Texas


First published at RT.com

Soured by the Democratic Party's documented bias for presidential nominee Hillary Clinton over rival Bernie Sanders, the Vermont senator's supporters are considering the Green Party, which is holding its national convention this week in Houston.

 The 2016 Green Party Presidential Nominating Convention in Houston, Texas, opened Thursday, August 4, and will run through the weekend. The party is expected to choose Massachusetts physician Jill Stein as its presidential nominee, along with her running mate, vice-presidential candidate Ajamu Baraka, a human rights activist. Stein was the party's presidential nominee in 2012.

The Green Party is poised for what could be an historic national election, as Greens are running in hundreds of campaigns across the US for offices as high as US senator. Stein has officially qualified to appear on the ballot in 23 states and the District of Columbia, and is expected to qualify in as many as 25 more states by the early-September filing deadline, according to Mark P. Jones, of the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University in Houston.

The Greens said they chose Houston, famous for being the epicenter of the American oil and gas industries, in part because of the party's advocation for alternative fuels and its broader concern over global climate change.

"We're putting out the message that we've got to break the addiction to fossil fuels," Scott McLarty, media director of the Green Party, told KPRC. "That it's really an emergency this century. The great crisis of the 20th century is climate change."

Activists Dr. Cornel West and YahNé Ndgo, both Bernie Sanders supporters, are the keynote speakers during the convention. West was appointed to the Democratic Party's platform drafting committee by Sanders. The activist raised concerns over the party's stance on Palestinian rights, and later endorsed the Green Party, saying "there’s no way, based on moral grounds, those based on my own moral conscience, that I could support [the Democratic Party] platform."

He added about Sanders' ultimate support for Clinton's nomination at the Democratic National Convention: "And once my dear brother moved into his endorsement, his strong endorsement of the neoliberal disaster that Sister Hillary represents, there was no way that I could stay with Bernie Sanders any longer, had to break with the two-party system."

West's discontent with the Democratic Party's platform is emblematic of many of Sanders' progressive supporters who are now considering a vote for the Green Party and Jill Stein in November's presidential election. In addition, revelations that surfaced just before the Democratic National Convention in late July showed that Democratic officials were working behind the scenes to ensure Clinton succeeded over Sanders in the party's presidential nomination race.

"I am still a Democrat, but I guess you could say we are a flight risk," Angelica Duenas, a former California delegate for Bernie Sanders, told RT in an interview from the convention hall at the University of Houston.

"So we are really looking at our options now. We really can't stand with Hillary Clinton as our nominee. We definitely can't stand with Donald Trump."

Duenas added that she and fellow Sanders supporters are attracted to Stein's presidential platform because it reflects Sanders' positions.

Responding to claims that voting Green is a wasted vote, or a vote that supports Trump, Duenas said the Democratic National Committee, the party's leadership arm, "had an opportunity to choose a stronger candidate that would definitely beat Donald Trump come November and they did not. At this point, we are not going to be influenced by fear tactics and the boogeyman narrative that they're painting."

Arn Menconi, a Green Party delegate and candidate for US Senate in Colorado, said the high voter dissatisfaction with both Clinton and Trump is an opportunity for a third party like the Greens to make inroads with disaffected Americans fed up with the two major parties. In fact, the party's theme for its 2016 convention is 'Houston, we have a solution. Vote Green 2016.'

"People are looking for someone, who's somebody I can trust, who is someone authentic, who's not taking special interest money," he told KPRC.

The Green Party's rising profile in 2016 will help the party's recognition and stature in the future. The Greens, like any third party that struggles for ballot access, must win a certain amount of support to maintain its ballot status in a state like Texas. For instance, one of the eight statewide Green Party candidates in Texas must win at least 5 percent of the vote in November for the state Green Party to avoid a laborious ballot access campaign in 2018.

"To qualify for ballot access in two years, the Green Party of Texas would have to obtain 47,183 valid signatures in less than three months from registered voters who did not vote in the 2018 Democratic or Republican primaries,"explained Mark P. Jones.

"Since many signatures end up being invalidated, the Greens would need to gather close to a 100,000 signatures to safely cross this threshold and qualify for ballot access, a Herculean task for a party with very limited resources."